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C O M P L E X  O P E R A T I O N S  C A S E  S T U D I E S  S E R I E S
Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and recon-
struction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of 
irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability opera-
tions frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including 
establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well-
being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive 
approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental 
and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community 
or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different 
components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. 
Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives 
to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development 
of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States 
Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the 
need for case studies and lessons.  Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought 
argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the 
pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the 
problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed 
this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need. 
In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships 
among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 
The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the impor-
tance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and pro-
vides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the 
production and distribution of learning about complex operations, includ-
ing supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 
Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the 
research direction and overall leadership for this project.
Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.
Produced 2010.  Material in this case study may be used without permission.
Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 
University.
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LEADING HEALING IN A BROKEN UNIT
What began as an orderly process to allow local civilians to pass through a 
crowded entry control point (ECP) ended when a lone man detonated 
explosives strapped to his body. The blast killed several marines and severely 
wounded nearly a dozen others. Military personnel had been processing 
civilians as usual that afternoon when the suicide bomber entered the check-
point. Standing between the barriers, he raised his arms in preparation for a 
search when he triggered the explosive device. The blast radiated in front of 
him on the interior side of the ECP, causing harm to those in close range. 
Characteristic of his command style, the senior enlisted leader (SEL), 
Roger Selden, was working directly with his men at the ECP. Their mission 
was to secure a small but significant city in their area of operations (AO). At 
the checkpoint that day, he had noticed the nervous and agitated behavior of 
the apparent suicide bomber, and at the last moment he positioned himself 
in front of one of his men, shielding him from the blast. Selden’s act pre-
served the lives of several of his men, but he was killed. 
ROGER SELDEN, SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER
Selden was an integral part of the day-to-day operations that led the ground 
combat element (GCE). This was his third tour to the Middle East. He had 
spent most of his time in reconnaissance units and had moved up the 
enlisted ranks, earning respect from his superiors and subordinates alike. 
Earlier in his career, he had been deployed to the Middle East for Operation 
Desert Storm. Now, with twenty-plus years in the service, he was months 
away from retirement to take up a new life with his family. He loved the mili-
tary, but he now felt he was being called to serve his country in a different 
way. He also wanted to complete his education and go into business or local 
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politics because of what he had learned in the military. After much discus-
sion with his family, he had decided it was time to make the move. 
Selden was blessed with an outstanding wife, Julie. The two had known 
each other since kindergarten when, after the second day, she threw a toy 
airplane at him that cut him just above his left eye. Selden enjoyed telling 
others that after twenty-two years of marriage, Julie still “knocks his block 
off” when he gets out of line. Roger and Julie were the parents of three chil-
dren. 
As a leader of other enlisted men, Selden understood that not everyone 
felt compelled or called to join the military. And yet, he found ways to help 
them discover what they wanted to become as a result of their decision to 
join, regardless of what it was initially. He was known to ask questions like, 
“As you think about your life, who has helped you become who you are 
today?” and “What do you want to become regardless of what happens in 
your life?” 
“Selden was like an experienced weatherman,” said a former command-
ing officer who had known him for more than ten years. “It was as if he could 
look at weather patterns and with accuracy anticipate what a storm would 
do and when it would hit. Selden had an uncanny ability to predict how his 
men would receive his leadership.” 
On one occasion while with his men on patrol, he noticed their watch 
conditions and its effect on their morale. 
“You’ve been working long hours out here,” he said, “and it’s not the 
most exciting place to spend long hours. Looks like you need more rotations 
and variability in your watch schedules.”
“Yes, sir. We’re kind of feeling burned out,” said a junior enlisted person.
“Sir. Not much happening here, and we’re getting pretty bored.”
“Remember to stay vigilant. Everyone’s depending on you. Tell you 
what, though, I’ll check with the OIC [officer in charge] and see what we 
can do about some rotations.”
He also knew when it would be most helpful to push or persuade, to be 
strict or to be more democratic, and how the person he was working with 
would respond. One time out with his men, he noticed them slipping. 
“I’m not real happy with what I’m seeing here,” he told them. “You’re 
being lazy when discharging weapons. That’ll lead to mistakes, and it’s going 
to cost someone. Safety is a top priority around here! And I don’t want to be 
in a position where I’m standing against you when it comes to being repri-
manded.”
Selden had not always had a strong awareness of others and his impact 
on them. It was something he had intentionally started working on not long 
after he and Julie started dating steadily. Some of the biggest difficulties he 
and Julie had experienced in their relationship centered on Selden’s ten-
dency to think he was being helpful when Julie did not see it that way. For 
example, Julie would talk to him about a frustrating day at work, and Selden 
would jump in and try to “solve her problems,” or he would try to encourage 
her, when all she wanted was someone to listen. 
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A fellow marine who knew both Julie and Roger well commented on 
Roger’s growing ability to understand others: “Early conflicts taught Roger 
to learn to look more outward and try to understand others enough so that 
when he did interject or try to help someone, he knew them enough to know 
whether what he said or did would be appropriate and more accurately fit 
what they really needed.” 
 It was routine before deployment for Selden to order his men to spend 
their time taking care of family needs and expressing their confidence in 
those they were leaving behind. While away from home, he would often ask 
his men when the last time was that they had spoken to their family and 
when the last time was that they had heard from them. He encouraged his 
men to tell him “the latest.” He had an ability to remember the details and 
would often follow up on the events they shared weeks after the fact. 
Since the beginning of the current deployment, Selden had felt that his 
men needed to keep focused and engaged so they would not get distracted 
and discouraged with too much down time. Selden would show up in the 
administrative section (in the Headquarters and Service Company, or H&S 
Company) and order his junior enlisted men to work a particular task, but 
this would often occur without first contacting the officer in charge of the 
section, usually an O-3 rank. The OIC of the section had less experience 
than the SEL, so violations in the command structure were not uncommon, 
but the OIC used his authority and chain of command on several occasions 
to set things right. It was ultimately the OIC’s responsibility to maintain the 
prioritized schedule in his section and ensure that requirements from any 
source first be presented to him. He met with the senior enlisted leader as 
well as the GCE commanding officer (CO) and often with the executive 
officer to correct inconsistencies in the chain of command. 
The CO or XO [executive officer] routinely called on Selden for advice 
when dealing with enlisted matters. Selden would first counsel his own men 
before he sent them to the CO, who, on recommendation from the SEL, 
would demote individuals based on their behavior. Likewise, when he saw 
an opportunity to praise his men, Selden would recommend awards or pro-
motions to the CO. He was known to make more recommendations for 
awards and promotions to the CO than any other leader; yet, Selden always 
had convincing documentation to back up his recommendation. As a result, 
almost of all of the requests were granted. When training future leaders, 
Selden would tell them, “It is important to catch your men at their best, and 
acknowledge it when you see it. Be specific with them so there is no doubt in 
their minds about the good you see in them.” If inspections were coming 
and he knew about it, he would tell his men to show their best and be their 
best. He then would expect solid feedback from those conducting inspec-
tions on what could be done better. Selden’s philosophy was that the best 
developmental feedback was built upon and took you beyond the best you 
could show. 
When not in combat, Selden was known for recommending lighter pun-
ishments when he saw a need to maintain morale over creating frustration 
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among the enlisted ranks. Before entering the AO, sometimes the enlisted 
men missed curfew. Those involved were to receive some degree of repri-
mand for not abiding by the rule, but it was Selden who would step in and, 
using his judgment, recommend a less severe sentence. What often was not 
generally known was that Selden would later meet alone with the enlisted 
man who had received a lighter punishment and tell him, “I know who you 
are, and I know what you are capable of.” Selden believed mistakes in non-
critical areas were tolerable and could serve as “teachable moments” for his 
men. Few would ever disappoint Selden a second time. In the combat zone, 
however, Selden had little tolerance for lax behavior. He often shared his 
discipline philosophy with his men and the officers: “There is a time to learn 
and a time to perform, and a time to learn about how you performed. The 
combat zone is not the time for lighter punishments when avoidable mis-
takes are made.” 
Selden was often with his men on combat patrols, working at the ECP, 
or simply spending down time with them and joking with them openly. He 
wanted to be approachable and not only knew the names of his men but also 
knew their spouses and families or girlfriends. 
The commanding officer knew Selden well. They had worked together 
in previous assignments. His assessment speaks to Selden’s deep commit-
ment to serving his men: 
“Selden helped his men draw on the legacy of the Marine Corps, a legacy of 
honor, courage, and commitment. Selden embodied these qualities. He upheld 
honor, exemplifying the ultimate standard of ethical and moral conduct, main-
taining unflinching personal integrity, and holding himself and others account-
able for their actions. He demonstrated courage and moral strength, which 
sustained him when faced with tough choices, hardships of combat, and adverse 
consequences. He was fully committed and dedicated to being a Marine. He 
voluntarily accepted assignments. In fact this was his third deployment to the 
AO.” 
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
The GCE is one element of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
comprised of both marines and sailors. The GCE includes its own headquar-
ters staff (H&S Company) with several sections, and at least two companies 
(see Exhibit 1). At the senior level is the commanding officer (CO), fol-
lowed by the executive officer (XO), who works for the CO and spends 
most of his time managing the day-to-day business of the sections, primarily 
in the H&S Company. The CO’s counterpart on the enlisted side is the SEL. 
An officer (designated as the officer in charge, or OIC) over each section 
had responsibility for his staff. The structure of the two companies is similar; 
each has a company commander, a company XO, and a first sergeant with a 
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number of platoons. The administrative section in the H&S Company was 
the important player after the suicide bombing.
The GCE was one with a long history in both world wars, the Korean 
War, Vietnam, various places in the Pacific (i.e., Guam, the Philippines), and 
later in the Middle East. Those attached to the unit took great pride in being 
a part of it. Known for its courage, honor, and cohesiveness through chal-
lenging operations, the unit had a deeply embedded culture that caused 
marines to identify strongly with the mission, purpose, and decades-long 
history. As an organization, the unit instilled a sense of purpose and a high 
degree of excitement for their missions. 
Selden spent considerable time with the H&S Company but also, as 
mentioned, worked alongside his men from the other two companies in the 
field. Their mission was to oversee ground security operations, train local 
forces, and search out insurgents. Their rules of engagement were clear: If a 
marine felt threatened by an enemy force or by an incident that was taking 
place, he was authorized to engage. The officers leading the various sections 
and combat elements held ultimate responsibility for the actions and activi-
Exhibit 1. Ground Combat Element Organizational Structure.
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ties of their individual units. These officers and their enlisted counterparts 
motivated and disciplined them and ensured high morale and cohesion 
despite potential challenges. 
PREDEPLOYMENT 
Senior military officials organized the MAGTF several months before 
deployment into CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command). The predeploy-
ment workups took nearly six months before leaving homes and families. 
The MAGTF organized the GCE in May—comprised of approximately 
1,200 individuals across several units. They did not depart until October. 
Early on, they spent time organizing the unit and integrating new members 
who would be deployed with them. They took time to get to know each 
other up and down the chain of command and used daily personal fitness 
and physical training sessions to build camaraderie. Through these activi-
ties, the ground, air, and logistics elements became increasingly familiar with 
each other. Each exercise in the workup cycle served as a building block to 
facilitate troop readiness and integration with all the command elements of 
the MAGTF.
Throughout the entire six-month workup, the unit trained as though 
their destination were the combat zone, even though they knew this deploy-
ment would be noncombat. The workup cycle was physically demanding 
and, during the training exercises, troops were away from families more than 
usual. The often dangerous and life-threatening hardships early on helped 
them establish mission purpose. For example, the unit preparations 
included simulated training and live fire exercises, as if the unit were living 
and working in the area of operations. The training command organized live 
fire zones complete with realistic simulations of IED attacks, house-to-house 
combat, and mortar attacks. The purpose of these exercises was to develop 
individual-, team-, and unit-level war-fighting skills. The urban warfare sim-
ulations provided practical applications for dealing with close quarters bat-
tle, urban reconnaissance, and surveillance training. Moreover, as they 
trained, the marines endured heat exhaustion, sleep deprivation, and the 
psychological effects of facing enemy combatants. While difficult, these 
exercises bolstered the unit’s collective confidence—the unit even achieved 
significant training certifications and awards designating them as combat 
ready.
Leadership discussions in the predeployment phase established perfor-
mance standards and reinforced a strong command-and-control military 
culture. Even though officers in the unit had less combat experience than the 
senior enlisted leader, the CO encouraged them to work closely with their 
enlisted counterparts, gain their support, and draw on their experience. 
Junior officers responded positively to these recommendations, often defer-
ring to the senior enlisted leader on matters dealing with the enlisted men in 
the unit. Junior officers were instructed to guide the teams and ensure 
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adherence to policy and procedures from a command perspective. Junior 
officers had responsibility for operations in the forward operating base, and 
the CO reinforced this in leadership discussions: “You are the leaders in 
these units. You will be called upon to manage crisis. You are to be strong in 
the face of these challenges. Your example and courage will not be lost on 
those you serve.” 
Selden respected the senior officers’ leadership counsel and help. He lis-
tened to and willingly accepted feedback from senior leadership and junior 
officers with whom he worked closely, and he always found ways to improve 
the performance of his men. As a result, he motivated his force from the get-
go. Throughout the predeployment period, Selden was often seen encourag-
ing his men and motivating them when they felt dejected and beaten. On 
one particularly difficult training day, the simulated enemy combatants had 
foiled their attempt to discover a weapons store, and they were nearly 
“killed” when the combatants planted an IED in their access road. After the 
training, Selden could sense the frustration of his men. He spoke with them 
frankly about their mistakes and then provided them some new strategies 
for facing the enemy. He shared stories of his own failures, particularly his 
own experiences in combat and how he had made it through tough situa-
tions.
At the end of the predeployment cycle, the unit began training with their 
navy counterparts. This involved transferring gear and equipment back and 
forth from their home base to port where they loaded and debarked to sea 
several times over a six-week period. The at-sea training exercises tested 
core capabilities and shipboard interoperability between the navy vessels 
and the MAGTF. Transitioning from land to sea introduced additional chal-
lenges, particularly for new marines who had not been at sea. The “Blue-
Green” integration meant marines learned “ship life,” became familiar with 
new routines in a unique environment, experienced what it was like to deal 
with small quarters onboard, and integrated with a different service. Navy 
sailors and marines worked alongside each other loading ships, perfecting 
routines to place on board equipment and supplies, and organizing ships for 
the deployment. Their initial mission was not a combat deployment but 
rather a strategic force protection. 
By and large, the unit was prepared for their overseas deployment. They 
proved they could work well together, and they had confidence in each 
other’s ability to handle important aspects of the mission. The enlisted 
marines were feeling the calm before the storm. Enlisted leaders had pre-
pared their men with precision and exactness. The predeployment exercises 
enabled them eventually to achieve “special operations capable,” a highly 
coveted certification indicating readiness and ability to perform a range of 
specialized operations, particularly to deploy into combat in CENTCOM’s 
AO. 
The well-conditioned unit, ready and anxious to pull out, embarked in 
October. Departure press releases captured enlisted marines’ enthusiasm, 
confidence, and mission-ready focus: “The operating tempo has been 
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unbelievable.” “The op tempo is as high as it has ever been.” “We’re pre-
pared to execute any mission we’re assigned as the theater reserve.” “We’re 
ready for everything from sustained combat operations ashore to humani-
tarian relief operations and everything in between.”
DEPLOYMENT
All members of the command headquarters and the population of marines 
and sailors within the unit were hoping to deploy into combat. As the unit 
was deployed, several troops began to ask questions. One junior officer 
asked whether they would be sent to the front and how that information 
would be communicated to them. Another asked how long the deployment 
would be and what resources would be required to stand up an operating 
base. These questions were unclear at the time of initial debarkation and 
would only become clearer piecemeal. Unlike the last deployment, what the 
unit’s members knew they were headed to a combat zone, this time deploy-
ment was not a given unless CENTCOM requested the support. “As far as I 
know, that's not going to happen this time,” said a staff sergeant, “but then, 
that could all change any time.” For the early part of the deployment, they 
spent time doing bilateral exercises with allied countries. These bilateral 
engagements, training-like exercises with other host nations, further 
enhanced the unit’s specialized expertise and increased their desire to be in 
the theater of operations. 
While they were not planning to be in combat, the senior staff knew how 
much the MAGTF wanted to be sent to the combat area of operations. They 
sought the opportunity to be part of the action rather than on the sidelines. 
As a result, senior leaders were doing their best to see if they could be part of 
the troop buildup. Even after they pulled out of port and sailed toward 
CENTCOM, their higher headquarters were in a political struggle to decide 
whether or not to send them into combat, because they were only desig-
nated as “strategic theater reserve” in the outlying areas. Senior leaders in 
the unit attempted to convince higher headquarters their unit should be sent 
to the front lines, given their special training and exceptional readiness sta-
tus. On board the ships, there was great anticipation about being in the com-
bat zone; many were quite anxious to be sent into the area of combat. 
Marines and sailors at the lower levels continuously asked whether they 
would be part of the troop buildup. The same answer always came back 
from their officers: “We don’t know,” or “We’ve not been told anything,” 
and “We are doing our best to get an answer to your question.” The tension 
mounted: originally, the unit knew its mission did not include combat oper-
ations, but as a unit they had trained as if they would be. Now the MAGTF 
senior officers were sending mixed signals, which resulted in some ambiva-
lence about their ultimate mission.
One junior officer summed up the sentiments of many:
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“You spend so many hours in preparation to execute on a mission. We are ready 
for that. I feel like I am in high school football again where you get tired of 2 and 
3-a-day practices and hitting each other. There comes a point where you are 
ready to face someone else and put your training and preparation to the test.”
The uncertainty surrounding their deployment was exacerbated when 
their families read the newspaper headlines: “MAGTF Sent to Combat” 
before the men in the unit even knew. Families then contacted their 
marines, asking whether it was true or not and why they had not received the 
news directly from them—why had the leadership not used the proper com-
munication channels to relay the information? The servicemen could not 
give their families an answer. While excited about the prospects of being 
sent into combat, the marines criticized the poor communications, which 
created a stir among the ranks: Junior officers and enlisted marines found 
out they would debark and begin operations before their superiors told 
them, and they wondered whether their superior officers were knowingly 
withholding information. Some marines expressed their dismay and loss of 
trust: “Do they know what our mission is?” “Don’t they think of these things 
before deployment?” and, “I’m not sure these leaders really know what they 
are doing.” And while the unit’s senior officers knew it was their duty to 
inform the men about the mission, they believed that someone at the Penta-
gon had leaked the information to the press. Yet, public affairs officials made 
no pubic statement about the leak.
Selden responded to these concerns by placing emphasis on being 
patient:
“Patience isn’t merely waiting for something to happen. You and I know we are 
ready to go, but being patient also requires actively working to take things as 
they come and trust that our senior leadership knows what is best for us, and 
when. Patience is not passive resignation, either. It is not simply enduring this 
wait but enduring it well. Let’s show them we can do that.”
When they finally arrived and debarked, the MAGTF divided geographi-
cally and functionally. Over a period of several weeks, the GCE secured their 
area and set up their command outpost. Enlisted marines and officers lived 
in primitive conditions as they commenced operations. They immediately 
began conducting combat operations and took casualties while living in very 
austere conditions. They slept in shell holes and later filled Hercules Engi-
neering Solutions Consortium (HESCO) barriers with dirt and sand to cre-
ate makeshift quarters (see Exhibits 2 and 3). It seemed that this early 
period, while testing the unit’s previous training, helped establish stronger 
unit cohesiveness. They were far from home doing their duty and being 
proud of the difference they were making in their area of operations. 
In large measure, the GCE achieved several visibly significant results 
early in their deployment. The area of operations had been a trouble spot for 
U.S. and coalition forces previously, due to its reputation for heavy violence 
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and as a hideout for insurgents. This did not deter the unit from its mission. 
Based on lessons learned, they secured the area, swept through the town, 
and set up security checkpoints. They turned their attention to working with 
locals with the intent of building trust among the town leaders and promi-
nent individuals, even training locals in counterinsurgency methods. Most 
importantly, they were instrumental, primarily through trust building, in 
helping the local population become weary of the intimidation and murder 
carried out by insurgents. In the weeks since they took over, the marines 
experienced a noted decrease in violence as local people grew tired of the 
insurgents. Ultimately the GCE forces were able to break the grip of anti-
coalition forces in the AO. 
DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT
Since arriving, the unit had experienced early excitement and visible accom-
plishments, but the deployment began to wear on as the unit spent Thanks-
Exhibit 2. Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium (HESCO) barriers. 
HESCO barriers are expandable, wire-mesh cells shown here filled on site 
with earthen material for use in civil and military applications: entry control 
points, command outposts, and force protection, as well as flood control and 
other Homeland Security contexts. In this photo, seabees assigned to Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion 5 lift a HESCO barrier into alignment dur-
ing a project at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, April 4, 
2009. 
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Patrick 
W. Mullen III, released/090411-N-8547M-025.
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giving, Christmas, New Year’s, and Valentine’s Day away from home. As the 
holiday seasons passed, the unit began to realize that the time was coming to 
wrap up their mission, but for some unknown reason higher headquarters 
postponed their scheduled departure. Earlier questions about the unit’s 
leadership effectiveness surfaced yet again, this time with respect to the 
unit’s extended deployment: “Maybe we’re still here because we’ve been too
successful.” And, “There certainly seems to be a lack of forward planning 
and poorly outlined timetables from higher headquarters.” 
Regardless, casualties continued to mount, information of the return 
remained inconsistent, and those who had been motivated for combat lost 
steam. Anxiety associated with unclear timetables began to wear on every-
one. Complaints from the men about the extensions increased. They simply 
wanted to go home, and the more time that passed, the more anxious they 
became.
The CO, junior officers, and the SEL watched the unit’s morale decrease 
as the men lost sight of the mission and defied safety rules. They became 
complacent about wearing their gear inside the compound, putting on their 
helmets outside the compound, and discharging their weapons properly. In 
Exhibit 3. HESCO Barriers Being Filled.
A Seabee assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 uses an up-
armored front-end loader to fill HESCO barriers during a project at Camp 
Bastion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, April 4, 2009.
Source: U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Patrick W. 
Mullen III, released/090411-N-8547M-011.
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some cases, they did not represent the United States with integrity and 
honor. There were incidences of stealing from each other and possibly dis-
rupting the lives of and violating those they intended to protect. While noth-
ing newsworthy occurred (such as an incident like Abu Ghraib), signs of 
disrespect for the local people increased. On several occasions when they 
used a local’s home as a lookout point, the unit would leave a mess or move 
and damage personal belongings or not return them. 
Selden was challenged with reining in their poor behavior. They contin-
ued to respect him and aligned their actions with his orders, especially when 
things were getting tough. 
“Yes, things were tough, but Selden did not show any sign of cracking, and that 
is what I would say kept most of us going. Had Selden started to complain or 
even just show signs of irritation with the situation, we would have felt it was 
license to voice our frustrations and things would have started to go sour real 
fast. That did not happen,” said one enlisted marine.
Nonetheless, the unit felt as though it might never leave. Furthermore, 
many of the members of the unit were dealing with miserable living condi-
tions while conducting combat operations twenty-four hours a day for three 
to four months, despite any efforts by Selden to alleviate stress from their 
patrols. As the days progressed, the lack of information on a return date and 
the physical and mental fatigue seemed to reach a peak when the suicide 
bomber killed their senior enlisted leader, Roger Selden. 
AFTER THE BLAST
The suicide bomb detonated at the ECP rocked the surrounding area. The 
men back at their command outpost not only heard but felt the blast, too. In 
the chaos of the moment, radio chatter immediately increased as squad lead-
ers, company leaders, and the command outpost worked to determine the 
location and seriousness of the bombing. Within minutes, the GCE com-
mander, though wounded, took control of the airwaves, silencing the chat-
ter. Back at the command, the administrative section’s OIC heard from the 
marine reporting the casualties. They shut down communications and 
waited until the convoy arrived at the command outpost. Upon his arrival, 
the reporting marine quietly indicated that Selden did not make it. Immedi-
ately, a somber mood of disbelief filled the room. 
An airlift quickly removed severely wounded men and those killed in 
action out of the area of operations, and the work of recovery began. For the 
next three days, the GCE administrative section made contact with officials 
stateside to let them know what had happened, who had died in the blast, 
and which family members to inform. Together they prepared packages for 
sending the deceased marine’s personal effects. His unit memorialized 
Selden while still deployed, and those at home followed suit. Some state-
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ments about Selden during various memorial services characterize his effect 
(see Exhibit 4).
The new SEL arrived a week or so later. His reception was rather cold. 
Regardless of his years of experience, he was not a member of the team. He 
had not trained with the unit and had not established the same rapport. One 
OIC said of the new SEL, “He was nothing to us. He did not even compare 
with SEL Selden. He simply filled a position and had really no leadership 
influence in the unit.” Of course, the new SEL was well aware of the big 
shoes he was filling—he did not even stand in the deployment picture with 
his men and those for whom he had direct responsibility. 
Now the unit faced new questions: How would Selden’s loss affect the 
unit? Would his loss paralyze the unit? What impact would this death and 
the subsequent overextended deployment have on their mission focus? 
Would a new leader be able to facilitate recovery and healing in the unit? 
Exhibit 4. Statements about Roger Selden from Fellow Marines and Family.
Marine Corporal
“Roger Selden saved my life. I am forever grateful for what he did for me.
  All of his tours of duty weren’t mandatory; he volunteered. He was battle-
tested and completely willing to do anything for his men, so much so that he 
stepped in front of the terrorist at the control point to save my life. When he saw 
the terrorist approaching, he didn’t hesitate to think about the political reasons 
for his actions, nor did he waste precious time to consider the moral founda-
tions for the war. Instead, he saw a threat and responded to it.”
Close Friend
“He was not born into a military background. In fact, no one in his immediate 
family had ever served in the military. Yet, from as long as anyone can remem-
ber, his favorite holiday was the Fourth of July, and he deeply loved the free-
doms he enjoyed in the United States. I’ve heard from others that Selden was an 
avid reader of American history early in his life, and this interest never waned. 
He was particularly fond of military history and felt a deep sense of patriotism. 
He regularly read the United States Constitution and Declaration of Indepen-
dence, and copies of these historic documents were among his prize posses-
sions. He kept them wherever he was stationed. He often recounted stories of 
bravery and unconventional wisdom shown by military personnel in the 
moments of combat. 
  “By the time Selden was in high school, he had decided to pursue a military 
career. When asked, he would tell you this decision made early in his life was not 
a choice but a ‘response to a call.’ He felt the military was what he was meant to 
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do in life. It was more than a duty and more than a sense of responsibility to pro-
tect and to honor.”
Fellow Marine
“For Selden, his profession was about being true to himself and to something 
greater than himself. Hearing him speak about his choice to be in the military, 
his men would often joke, saying he sounded like he was talking about joining 
the ministry, not the military. He would admit it sometimes sounded this way, 
but he never apologized for it.”
Friend and Former Marine
“Selden was a great man. He did it all and asked for more. I served under him in 
infantry school. We all watched together the planes fly into the [Twin] Towers 
on 9/11. He made a huge impact on my life, personally and in the military. He 
was my friend. He always looked out for me. He used to ask me, ‘What did you 
do today, to prepare?’ He pushed us hard, because he knew it was his job. He 
loved the military, and he loved the men under him. 
  “To his family, I grieve with you. I am sorry for your loss. I will miss him 
dearly all the rest of my days. I pray that the Lord is with your family at your 
time of sorrow.”
Family Member
“Roger was always healthy and alive, a perfectionist in what he did and who 
made anything seem possible. I always thought he wouldn’t be one of those 
people who wouldn’t come home. In my eyes, he was Superman.
  “He could have moved up even further as an officer, but he wouldn’t have 
been as hands-on. He just wanted to make a difference. Anytime he was asked 
to go somewhere, even times when he didn’t have to, he would. He wanted to 
be there for his troops.”
Exhibit 4. Statements about Roger Selden (continued)
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